

EDITED BY

EDWARD G. GRAY

JANE KAMENSKY

The Oxford Handbook *of* THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Edited by

EDWARD G. GRAY

and

JANE KAMENSKY

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Maps

1. European empires in North America, 1763

2. Native groups of eastern North America

3. *North America, as Divided amongst the European Powers*, by Samuel Dunn (London, 1776). *Courtesy of the David Rumsey Map Collection, www.davidrumsey.com*



4. *1776: Map of the Original Thirteen Colonies*, by Samuel Augustus Mitchell (Philadelphia, 1880). *Courtesy of the David Rumsey Map Collection, www.davidrumsey.com*



5. Britain's world war, 1775–1783

6. United States and European territorial claims, 1783

INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS

EDWARD G. GRAY AND
JANE KAMENSKY

Few events in American history attract as much attention as the Revolution. Politicians routinely quote Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and Patrick Henry. Schools, museums, the press, and the public commemorate significant Revolutionary-era dates. The best-seller list seems never to be without at least one title that references America's founding and its "fathers."

Among academic historians, however, the Revolution has come to occupy a distinctly less prominent place than it held a generation ago. Fewer courses are framed around the subject; fewer journal articles and monographs engage it; fewer dissertations plumb its depths. There are a number of explanations for this apparent shift in interest. In recent years, for instance, students of premodern North America have moved away from questions about the origins of the United States and toward explorations of larger Atlantic or continental arenas.[1] There is another cause as well, a much older one. At least since the 1960s, and arguably long before, scholars of the period have struggled to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable interpretations of the formation of the United States. Some insist that the Revolution is best understood as an intellectual event, driven by ideas about liberty, property, and tyranny articulated by a select group of elite founders. By contrast, many social historians see the Revolution not as the work of remote thinkers and theorists, but as a fundamentally popular and even populist revolt in which ordinary people challenged self-interested elites. For decades, a pitched battle between these two interpretive

camps yielded ever-more Manichean and absolute postures. For some, as the intellectual historian Daniel Rodgers has written, the terms of scholarly debate became "reflexively dualistic: ideas versus behavior; rhetoric versus 'the concrete realities of life'; propaganda and mystification on the one hand, the real stuff on the other."[2] No wonder many young scholars turned toward less highly charged subject matter as they sought to enter the profession.

The tension between a revolution of cultural elites and one of ordinary people lingers. But in recent years, historians have identified new angles of vision that transcend that tension. With new frameworks to test and refine, scholars have returned to the Revolution that remade America, remaking the Revolution in turn. Cultural historians have begun to find meaning in language, sentiment, and the material world that transcends the elite-plebeian dichotomy.[3] Institutional historians—historians of law, of business, of the military, of government, of the household, and others—have likewise found compelling ways to capture the full social and intellectual spectrum in one revolutionary story.[4] Atlantic and imperial historians place the American founding in a broader transnational context, considering its place among a series of transformations that shaped life in the Atlantic littoral.[5] In place of a singular event, directed solely at the formation of the United States, and thus subject to monocausal explanations of its origins and results, we confront a series of complex and interlinked historical processes: the triumph of one empire over its European rivals, followed by a series of rebellions within that empire, some of which converged in the creation of a new United States.

Drawing on this new work, assembling scholars from several generations, trained in multiple disciplines, with varying national and regional specializations, the *Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution* seeks to capture the fullest sense of what the American Revolution means at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Methodologically pluralist, even promiscuous, this *Handbook* is crowded with unfamiliar as well as better-known characters, male and female, native and Anglo, "British" and "American," leaders and ordinary people. Elites come down to earth through explorations of their material lives. "The people" wrestle with lofty ideas as well as pressing economic interests. Revolutions are waged among sometimes-reluctant patriots and often-ambivalent loyalists, with many neutrals occupying a spectrum of positions in between. The walls between the shifting sides are thin, even permeable. Many of the combatants emerge as hesitant creatures of empire rather than zealous progenitors of a nation.

Looking West, Looking East

For readers in the United States, histories of the war between Britain and her mainland North American colonies are, at their deepest level, origins stories, which is one reason so many books about the Revolution have the word *birth* in their

titles.[6] The story of the Revolution is our book of Genesis. Taking a god's-eye view from blockaded Boston harbor or Carpenters' Hall in Philadelphia, we wait for the United States to emerge from dark and formless void. Dawn breaks, and a string of glorious begats follows; Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and Adams stride through our pages like gods in tricorn hats.

This view from America's port cities may be stirring, but it is necessarily incomplete—provincial by definition. The chapters that make up this volume often look toward an emerging United States from the vantage point of the thirteen rebellious colonies. But they take a range of other views as well, facing west from London, north from the West Indies, and east from Indian country. Touching down in places as far-flung as France and Poland, Jamaica and Sierra Leone, the country of the Six Nations and Bengal, this volume returns the American Revolution to the world and the world to the American Revolution.

America's Revolution was Britain's American War: a series of fateful moves in the high-stakes chess game of the European great powers, and a chapter in the entangled history of a vast and growing empire. In crucial respects, London looked first to Paris and Madrid, then to Brussels, Amsterdam, and Vienna. "The history of eighteenth-century Britain was in Europe," the English historian Brendan Simms proclaims. "Foreign policy, rather than taxation, popular unrest, religion, elections or colonial expansion, was the central political preoccupation" of the realm.[7] However difficult to govern, America—especially continental America—was something of a sideshow. The American War—like the French and Indian War before it, and King George's War before that—was the far western front in the centuries-long battle for political and military supremacy on the European continent. In the regular course of human events, Whitehall was far more anxious about Versailles than about Virginia.

Of course, the view from London did not end in Europe, but extended east and farther south as well as west, following the sinews of power to the ragged edges of empire. As Maya Jasanoff has argued, Clive's victory over the nawab of Bengal in 1757, not Wolfe's victory over Montcalm's forces at Quebec two years later, "may well have been the defining imperial battle" of the Seven Years' War.[8] After its stunning victory in that global conflict, Britain's territorial claims stretched from Fort Bute on the Mississippi River to Fort William at Calcutta. By 1770, the first voyage of Captain James Cook had pushed the imperial frontier all the way to Botany Bay. An empire so vast came at a steep cost. The British government struggled to govern polities as diverse as the "natives of *Hindostan* and those of *Virginia*," as Edmund Burke noted in the 1770s.[9] One size fit few. Efforts to reform the empire in the 1760s—through taxes and trade prohibitions—were understood by American patriots to be exceptional and punitive. In fact, they were acts of *inclusion*: attempts to bring the Americans into an increasingly well-fenced and carefully tended imperial fold. "For all their cocksure certainty," Eliga Gould has written, "the British saw their actions toward the colonies as fundamentally pacific."[10] Their purpose, at least in the eyes of imperial reformers, was to bring greater harmony to the full, vast range of British imperial possessions, and greater security to the British subjects who lived in them. The view from North America was different, and often opposed; one nation's pacifism was

another's bellicosity. The war came, and shockingly, the Continentals won it. But many British officials understood the loss of the rebellious North American colonies less as a fatal blow than as the high price of success, an object lesson that would prove instructive in South Asia, the Antipodes, and Africa.

Britain lost only parts of America—thirteen of twenty-six colonies on the western side of the Atlantic.[11] The Union Jack continued to fly over great swaths of the North American mainland, from Halifax to the upper Mississippi. For decades, the continent simmered with tension between those who professed fealty to King George and those who declared themselves independent citizens of the American republic. In 1812, those tensions boiled over in a second Anglo-American civil war.[12]

Britain also retained the islands of the West Indies, the glittering jewels in the empire's crown. Long before the Revolution, the price fetched by Caribbean sugar dwarfed the value of all other streams of colonial tribute: tobacco, rice, and indigo from Virginia and the Carolinas; wheat and naval stores from the mid-Atlantic; lumber and salted fish from New England and the Maritime provinces. Losing the colonies from New Hampshire to Georgia was, in part, the cost of defending the Greater and Lesser Antilles—a cost the British government was willing to bear.[13]

The strategic and economic importance of Jamaica, Barbados, and Britain's other Caribbean possessions was proportional not only to the sugar they produced, but to the African men and women they consumed. The Crown's commitment to holding the West Indies reminds us of the centrality of the Atlantic slave system to the metropolis and its colonies. What David Brion Davis decades ago labeled "the problem of slavery in the Age of Revolution" became the central moral dilemma of the age, on both sides of the Atlantic.[14] "How is it that we hear the loudest *yelps* for liberty among the drivers of negroes?" Samuel Johnson pondered in 1775. Slavery, not taxation, was the real tyranny, he insisted.[15] The pervasive language of liberty, along with the disruptions of wartime, energized the freedom struggle of Africans and their descendants in the New World. A vocal minority of men and women of European descent—particularly in the former colonies that depended least upon slave labor—likewise became troubled by the existence of slavery in a land where nature's god had created all men equal. Meanwhile, invoking their rights to property, slaveholders in the plantation colonies redoubled their commitment to a system of forced labor that had once seemed natural, but now required an increasingly elaborate legal and intellectual defense.

In addition to national, imperial, and Atlantic views, many of the chapters in this *Handbook* offer what we might call a *continental* perspective on the Revolution, placing contests over the lands of the North American interior front and center. These struggles were not new in the 1770s. Britain, France, and their native allies and enemies had warred over the heart of the continent numerous times, most spectacularly in the great war for empire that concluded in 1763. So, too, indigenous Americans, settler-colonists, and speculators had skirmished over land claims in the backcountry for generations, and did so with increasing frequency after the Peace of Paris transferred control of all lands east of the Mississippi to Britain. In what Daniel Richter calls "the shared Euro-Indian transatlantic imperial world" before 1763, the balance of power in inland North America had been complex, shifting,

and multisided.[16] Native leaders held many trump cards in the game. After 1763, the game grew simpler and starker. In Indian country as in the colonies, positions hardened and new lines were drawn. A new generation of indigenous prophets called for pan-Indian solidarity among the continent's "red" men, while a new generation of settler-speculators rallied "whites" against Indians. For some Euro-Americans, anti-Indian hatred and the rejection of the British monarch came to be one and the same. The Declaration of Independence thus spoke in soaring terms of the equality of all humanity, yet also accused George III of having "endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers . . . merciless Indian savages."[17]

By focusing on contested North American frontiers, several of the *Handbook* chapters suggest a significant shift in the core narrative of the Revolution. The familiar tale of money and politics—taxation and representation—is joined and made more complex by stories focused on territorial sovereignty and native dispossession. At a treaty conference in Easton, Pennsylvania, in 1757, Teedyuscung, a leader of the eastern Delaware, summarized this facet of the conflict succinctly: "The Land is the Cause of our Differences," he explained—"that is our being unhappily turned out of the land is the cause." That year the Delaware won concessions by pitting the interests of the "Great King across the Water" against those of colonial governors nearer at hand. After the Seven Years' War, room for such negotiations diminished sharply. British settlers poured into the backcountry. Teedyuscung was murdered in 1763, in an arson attack on his cabin that spread to consume twenty other buildings in the town of Wyoming, on the banks of the Susquehanna River, in Pennsylvania's northeastern corner. Warriors from the Iroquois Confederacy were blamed for the killing, but historians now think the likelier culprits were agents of Connecticut's Susquehanna Land Company, who less than two weeks after Teedyuscung's death began settling the acres on which his village had stood.[18] In the years ahead, the war between natives, settlers, and rulers over their competing claims to American territory would overspread much of the continent.

American origins stories need new settings, then, and new narratives as well. A focus on the worlds beyond what came, in the nineteenth century, to be called "the original thirteen colonies" reminds us that there was far more *pluribus* than *unum* in colonial North America, even in *British* North America. The struggle to craft a nation from this fluid, polyglot, bumptious multitude was protracted and violent, a bloody civil war that raged from Halifax to Havana and embroiled much of Europe from 1775 through 1782.

The Long Revolution

If the *where* of the Revolution has become increasingly ambiguous, the *when* likewise presents new challenges. Although there are some very clear turning points—the end of the Seven Years' War (1763), the Stamp Act (1765), the fighting

at Lexington and Concord (1775), the formal declaring of independence (1776), the Peace of Paris (1783), the ratification of a federal constitution (1789)—the time line for the Revolutionary era remains elusive. But one impulse seems clear: contemporary scholars are inclined to see the American Revolution less in terms of a series of discreet, momentous turning points and more in terms of the *longue durée*: a swath of historical time, lasting half a century or more, characterized by many of the phenomena and processes commonly attributed to a much narrower Revolutionary time line. Many of the changes scholars once made synonymous with the Revolution started much earlier, or were completed much later, or both.

Take American independence, for example. For decades before the Seven Years' War, many imperial thinkers had argued that the combined forces of economy, geography, and demography made the eventual independence of the American colonies inevitable. Yet for even the most rebellious British colonists in the 1770s, prospect of independence seemed terrifying. As late as March 1776, John Adams called "Independency…an Hobgoblin, of so frightful Mein, that it would throw a delicate Person into Fits to look it in the Face."[19] The congeries of men and women who mustered the courage to stare that hobgoblin down were shifting and fluid in their composition and their interests; their unity was sometimes opportunistic and often illusory.

In sum, the patriots' "glorious cause" comprised many causes, which only sometimes intersected. The declaration in July 1776 that "these United Colonies" were and ought to be "Free and Independent States" was far more surprising than it was predestined.

For people of color, women, and white men without property, it was perhaps less surprising than disappointing. For these Americans, independence remained an abstraction for decades—and in some cases centuries—after the Revolution's end. Relatively few of them came away from the Revolutionary years with all that republican citizenship promised. Many lacked the right to vote or to hold property; a substantial minority continued to be considered *as* property, human chattel in an empire for liberty, as Jefferson called it. Indeed, in some respects there seemed to be two distinct revolutions—one democratic, plural, and plebeian; the second, controlled, uniform, and elite. In many spheres of life, from law and public policy to marriage and sexuality, the new nation experienced what Rosemarie Zagarri has called a "Revolutionary backlash" in the 1780s and 1790s.[20]

For the United States as a nation among nations, independence was similarly fraught. America came into being in part because it was recognized as such by powerful European states. But what exactly did this recognition mean? Did the United States in fact conclude its Revolution a free and independent member of the community of Atlantic nations? As with so many other cherished chestnuts of national memory, upon close examination this one turns out to be only partly true. The United States may have been independent of the legislative authority of Parliament or the sovereign authority of the monarch, but they were not ultimately free from the British Empire.

Perhaps the most profound indication of just how tenuous American independence was comes from the framers of the Constitution. Although they agreed

on very little, one thing was clear to virtually all the participants in the laborious process of reform that began in the spring of 1787: under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress would be unable to insure the security of the new American republic. Much like the small, weak states that preceded them, the United States would have to form a much stronger union. As James Madison observed, throughout history "feeble communities, independent of each other, have resorted to Union . . . for the common safety ag[ain]st powerful neighbors, and for the preservation of peace and justice among themselves."[21] The very foundation of America's federal republic, that is, was partly driven by the tenuousness of American independence.

If many scholars now approach American independence with a certain amount of caution, they insist upon similar complexity when it comes to the matter of the era's politics and government. Here, too, contemporary historians find continuity where a generation ago historians more often tended to find rupture. To be sure, the state and federal republics the Americans created rested on a profound redistribution of political authority. Yet the shift in power from the king-in-Parliament to the people had begun well before the Revolution's first battles. In Massachusetts, for instance, that story is a long one—beginning decades before the Revolution and culminating in the kind of direct democracy that came to be practiced there as the colony became a state. In Virginia, new patterns of popular political participation emerged in the 1760s in response to local events, and shaped the political process that ultimately led to independence. In these and other colonial locales, much that is revolutionary about the American Revolution—the transfer of governing authority from an imperial regime to the people themselves—had begun years before independence was actually declared.

When it comes to political change, exactly what can be attributed to the events that unfolded between 1775 and 1789? The question becomes even more pressing when we recognize, as Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and others began to do in the 1960s, that the ideologies and conceptual frames through which many Americans interpreted Revolutionary events had their origins in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Britain.[22] From the English Civil War through the early years of the Hanoverian dynasty, Britons in the home islands plumbed the shortcomings of monarchy as thoroughly as did British subjects in the distant American colonies—indeed, more so. As the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume observed in 1742, well before the first stirrings of revolution in America, "the mere name of King commands little respect; and to talk of a king as God's vice regent upon earth, or to give him any of these magnificent titles which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in any one." Few carried such thinking to the extreme of imagining a world without kings. But for the Americans, that leap was made possible, at least in part, by a transatlantic political culture that saw monarchs as no more sacred or divinely ordained than any other element of England's mixed constitution.[23]

If the republic Americans created emerged from the fertile soil of pre-Revolutionary Anglo-American political thought, how novel was the United States? Did its creation, as Thomas Paine famously hoped, in fact "begin the world

over again?"[24] For many observers, Paine included, the answer suggests historical continuity as much as revolutionary rupture. The Americans may not have created a constitutional monarchy built upon the economic foundation of overseas colonies. But they did create an empire—not a colonizing, oceanic empire like its British counterpart, but an empire nonetheless. Through war, settlement, and trade, the new nation slowly extended its territorial claims across North America. To the chagrin of many Americans, the Continental Congress and the union that replaced it only seemed to encourage this empire building. As one opponent of the Constitution warned, "It is the opinion of the ablest writers on the subject, that no extensive empire can be governed upon republican principles, and that such a government will degenerate to a despotism."[25]

In the immediate aftermath of the war, such fears were compounded by the simple fact that American empire faced an imperial arena populated by old hands. Britain, in particular, would come out of the Revolution with its imperial ambitions almost fully intact. The "American War" had little enduring impact on politics in Britain.[26] With the help of the French Revolution and America's former friend, Edmund Burke, the British government was able to quash most reformist sentiment at home and freely pursue imperial ambitions abroad. Indeed, the British Empire may actually have emerged from the American War a stronger, more nimble entity. For a succession of American administrations, struggling to fend off British intrusions in the far West and at sea, it may at times have seemed as if the American colonies' subordinate status as colonies had been only nominally challenged. As Eliga Gould has suggested, Britain retained in America "an informal empire, one based on the commercial supremacy of British ships and goods, on regional networks of British satellites and tributary allies, and on Britain's ability to impose its own conceptions of international law and order on other governments and peoples."[27] American independence remained incomplete independence for decades, if not for centuries. Novus ordo seclorum? Yes and no.

An Ongoing Revolution

"The American Revolution was not a common event," John Adams wrote to the Baltimore printer Hezekiah Niles in February 1818. "Its effects and consequences have been awful over a great part of the globe," and rippled still. "But what do we mean by the American Revolution?" he asked. "Do we mean the American War?" Certainly not; "the Revolution was effected before the war commenced." The Revolution was not won on the battlefield, or cemented in the halls of Congress. No, Adams argued, a "*radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.*" In place of the old hierarchical bonds that constituted British society, Americans had created new fraternal ones, linking human beings in a common polity.

Understanding this slow and subtle reformation "in the minds and hearts of the people" would be, Adams explained, the obligation of American historians. "By what means this great and important alteration in the religious, moral, political, and social character of the people of thirteen colonies, all distinct, unconnected, and independent of each other, was begun, pursued, and accomplished, it is surely interesting to humanity to investigate, and perpetuate to posterity." Adams could imagine no better occupation for the "young gentlemen of letters in all the states, especially in the thirteen original states," than "to undertake the laborious, but certainly interesting and amusing, task of searching and collecting all the records, pamphlets, newspapers, and even handbills which in any way contributed to change the temper and views of the people and compose them into an independent nation."[28]

At the end of Adams's long and eventful life, fifty years to the day after the Declaration was signed, that labor had barely begun. Nearly two centuries later, ladies as well as gentlemen pursue it, in the original thirteen colonies, across the United States, and around the globe. Readers will find in this volume grounds for continued debate and discussion, as well as wide-ranging expertise and a healthy dose of good old-fashioned storytelling. Together and separately, these thirty-three chapters demonstrate that the American Revolution remains as vibrant and inviting a subject of scholarly inquiry as it was in John Adams's day. In this *Handbook* and beyond, the work continues.

Notes

1. For examples of oceanic and hemispheric perspectives on the history of the Americas during the Revolutionary era see J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), pt. 3; Kären Wigen et al., "*Forum*: Oceans of History," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 3 (June 2006): 717–780; Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 764–786; and David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800,* ed. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 11–27. The continental perspective is well represented in Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Viking/Penguin, 2001), esp. pt. 3; and Daniel K. Richter, *Before the Revolution: America's Ancient Pasts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

2. Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," *Journal of American History* 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 25. For evidence that little changed in the ensuing decade and a half see Thomas Slaughter, "Plus Ça Change . . . ," *Reviews in American History* 34, no. 3 (September 2007): 291–506; and Staunton Lynd et al., "*Forum:* Economics and American Independence," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., vol. 68, no. 4 (October 2011): 597–656.

3. For an exploration of recent developments in eighteenth-century American cultural history see Michael Meranze, "Culture and Governance: Reflections on the Cultural History of Eighteenth-Century British America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., vol. 65, no. 4 (October 2008): 713–744.

4. Important implications of this return to institutional history are explored in William J. Novak, "The Myth of the 'Weak' American State," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 752–772.

5. See, for examples, Eliga H. Gould and Peter Onuf, eds., *Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History* (New York: NYU Press, 2009); and David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *The Age of Revolutions in a Global Context* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

6. The classic example is Edmund S. Morgan, *The Birth of the Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); but see also, more recently, works as different in their interpretations of the Revolution as Gordon S. Wood, *The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States* (New York: Penguin, 2011); and Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (New York: Viking/Penguin, 2005). Many other titles contain the word "origins," including, famously, Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); and, more recently and ideologically opposed, Woody Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007).

7. Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–1783* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 1. See also H. T. Dickinson, ed., *Britain and the American Revolution* (New York: Longman, 1998); and Stephen Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

8. Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750–1850* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 20.

9. Burke quoted in P. J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750–1783* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 204.

10. Eliga H. Gould, "Fears of War, Fantasies of Peace: British Politics and the Coming of the American Revolution," in Gould and Onuf, *Empire and Nation*, 19–35, quotation at 20; see also Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and Jack P. Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

11. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).

12. Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812*: *American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010); Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011).

13. O'Shaughnessy, *Empire Divided*; and David Geggus, "The Caribbean in the Age of Revolution," in Armitage and Subrahmanyam, *Age of Revolution*, 83–100.

14. David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975). See also Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: The Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). The classic statement of the vexed relationship between slavery and freedom in American history remains Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975).

15. Samuel Johnson, *Taxation No Tyranny; An Answer to the Resolutions and Address of the American Congress* (London: printed for T. Cadell, 1775), 89.

16. Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of North America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 188.

17. Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007); and Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

18. Teedyuscung quoted in E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York: Procured in Holland, England, and France*, vol. 7 (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Co., Printers, 1856), 300–301. On his death see Anthony F. C. Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700–1763* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), esp. 258–263.

19. John Adams to Horatio Gates, Philadelphia, 23 March 1776, in *Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789*, 26 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976–2000), ed. Paul H. Smith, vol. 3, 429–432. See also Benjamin H. Irvin, "Independence before and during the Revolution," chapter 8, this volume.

20. Rosemarie Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).

21. "Preface to the Debates in the Convention," in James Madison, *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), 3. See also Max M. Edling, "A More Perfect Union: The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution," chapter 21, this volume.

22. Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*; Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); and Jack P. Greene, ed., *The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, 1763–1789* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

23. Quoted in Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (1963; paperback ed., New York: Viking, 1965), 113.

24. *Common Sense*, in *Thomas Paine: Collected Writings,* ed. Eric Foner (New York: Library of America, 1995), 52.

25. James Winthrop, "The Agrippa Letters," letter 4, December 3, 1787, excerpted in *Colonies to Nation, 1763–1789: A Documentary History of the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Greene (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 560.

26. Dickinson, *Britain and the American Revolution*, esp. 20–22.

27. Eliga H. Gould, "The Empire That Britain Kept," chapter 25, this volume.

28. Adams to Hezekiah Niles, February 13, 1818, in *Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams (1856), 10:282–283, emphasis in original. Available in the Online Library of Liberty, at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2127&chapter=193604&layout=html&Itemid=27.

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PART I

CULTURES AND CRISES

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CHAPTER 1

BRITAIN'S AMERICAN PROBLEM: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

P. J. MARSHALL

A most distinguished recent study of the "global" Seven Years' War begins with the proposition that "the ultimate object of statesmen in London . . . was to maintain and increase security, power and influence in Europe."[1] A chapter on the place of the American colonies in Britain's global concerns must begin in the same way: the American colonies were primarily valued in Britain for the contribution that they made to Britain's security, power, and influence in Europe. Eighteenth-century British opinion considered that the nation's standing rested not, as some later generations were to think, on its possession of a worldwide empire, but on its eminence among the powers of Europe. From Europe came danger as well as prestige. That the French, Britain's inevitable enemy in this period, might invade the British Isles was a recurring British fear. French invasions were indeed projected in 1745, in 1759, and in 1779, jointly with the Spanish.

If Europe dominated the worldview of British people, the extent to which Britain needed actively to intervene in the affairs of the Continent to protect its own interests was a matter for perennial controversy.[2] There was an often raucous tradition that demanded as little involvement as possible. Britain should avoid Continental entanglements, relying on its navy to protect it from invasion and concentrating its resources on colonies and commerce outside Europe, which were the vital sources of its wealth. Disrupting French trade and seizing French colonies was the best way

for Britain to weaken France. Such strategies had wide popular appeal. They were alleged both to be relatively cheap and to be certain to enhance Britain's wealth through the expansion of British trade. A strong navy, supported by a part-time militia of sturdy yeomen, was the proper safeguard of a free people. Commitments to Continental Europe, by contrast, were seen as extremely expensive, associated with the high taxation needed to pay for subsidies to Britain's European allies or for the professional standing army (disliked as alien to England's libertarian tradition) that would be sent to fight on the Continent. The objectives of European policies were likely not to be truly British objectives but those of Britain's Continental allies or of its Dutch and Hanoverian kings in the first half of the eighteenth century.

Those who considered that Britain must be actively engaged in Europe deployed a wide range of arguments. It was a fundamental British interest that France should not be permitted to dominate Europe. What British people called "the liberties of Europe" must be sustained against French hegemony. Britain must actively seek to promote a balance to check France among the European powers. Security from invasion required not just naval supremacy but the tying down of France in European wars that would divert French resources from any attempted descent on the British Isles. Free from European commitments, France could be expected to develop a powerful navy, which would be a threat to Britain's worldwide trade and to British colonies. Britain also had specific European interests that must be safeguarded. The French must be kept out of the Austrian Netherlands (modern Belgium), which would provide them with a springboard from which to mount an invasion, and Britain must have access to the naval stores of the Baltic, to Mediterranean trade secured by bases at Gibraltar and Minorca, and to Brazilian gold shipped in through Britain's ally Portugal, whose independence must be assured. Finally, there was the question of Hanover. From 1714 the British kings were also the electors—that is the rulers—of Hanover. Expending British resources on the king's German dominions was rarely popular, but if the French were able to take Hanover, they could force Britain to relinquish overseas gains in return for restoring the elector.

British historians in the high days of empire in the later nineteenth or the early twentieth century tended to assume that worldwide empire was Britain's manifest destiny and to condemn Continental entanglements as a distraction from it. They attributed such views to contemporaries, particularly to the elder Pitt, who was given a place in the pantheon of pioneer empire builders. Modern scholarship is rightly skeptical about the imperial visions of eighteenth-century statesmen, including Pitt.[3] For him and his contemporaries, colonies were the means of ensuring security and influence in Europe. For Britain's rulers, policy was a matter of balancing resources between European and extra-European objectives that were in many respects interconnected: some ministers inclined more to global priorities, others to Continental ones. In their assessments of the successes and failures of British policies, historians show the same tendencies to incline to one side or the other. Arguments that designs to maintain a European balance of power were "specious" and that Britain's interests were best served by standing on the defensive

in Europe while concentrating on a "blue water" naval strategy[4] have recently been countered with the view that "a forward policy in Europe best secured Britain's maritime predominance, whereas a narrow focus on ruling the waves was in fact the best way of losing them to her rivals."[5]

There is general agreement about the main trends in British foreign relations in the period of the American Revolution. During the Seven Years' War, either because wise counsel prevailed (an interpretation that normally focuses on Pitt) or because piecemeal responses to an unfolding situation turned out surprisingly well, Britain succeeded in achieving an effective distribution of resources between European and global theaters of war. British money and British troops helped Britain's allies to contain the French in Germany, while Britain made worldwide conquests. Throughout the 1760s and 1770s, however, the British became increasingly isolated in Europe, so that they had to try to crush the American rebellion without a European ally and therefore without any distraction to prevent the French and later the Spanish from concentrating their resources on a naval war against Britain. Whether Britain in the absence of European intervention would have been capable of defeating the American rebellion is doubtful, but after 1778 and 1779 the British were forced to divert their resources to a wider war, and the intervention of the French fleet and expeditionary force at Yorktown in 1781 was to be decisive.

Europeans had been aware of the connection between global resources and the balance of power on the Continent at least since the sixteenth century, when it became obvious that the silver of the New World had greatly enhanced the power of Spain to pursue its ambitions in Europe. By the eighteenth century both the French and the British feared that the other would become the master of Spain's American bullion and that this together with the wealth generated from their American trades would give one or the other supremacy in Europe. By the 1740s British opinion was taking fright at the growth of French overseas trade, especially the success of their Caribbean plantations and of their East India Company. France's commercial wealth would enable it to assert a "universal monarchy" over Europe. The French had very much the same fears about the implications of British global expansion, which they too thought was aiming at universal monarchy. "If anything can, in fact, destroy the superiority of France in Europe, it is the English naval forces," the French king was advised in 1750. Unchecked, the British would soon be able to monopolize the trade of North America and the West Indies, which would "most certainly give them superiority in Europe."[6] The connections that both the British and the French were drawing between colonies and oceanic trade and power in Europe in the mid-eighteenth century made it highly likely that any war between Britain and France would start outside Europe, probably in North America, where tensions were mounting, and that it would spread round the world.

The prospect of a global war forced the British governing elite to confront what they came to conceive to be their American problem: the weak governance of Britain's dependencies seemed to render the colonies incapable of defending themselves or of making an adequate contribution to Britain's efforts to defend them.

Although the disastrous consequences that followed from British attempts to solve their American problem have focused historians' attention on that problem, the British also faced a similar Irish problem, a West Indian problem, and a problem with the East India Company in India. Imperial control needed to be strengthened in order to ensure greater contributions throughout the empire.

The American problem forced itself on British attention when news reached London of events that were to be the trigger for the Seven Years' War. In 1754 the French deployed a considerable military force into the valley of the Ohio, to check the expansion of the British colonies. British ministers believed that if the French succeeded, "all North America will be lost."[7] A collapse of empire in North America with the cutting off of American trade would inflict hardship on every section of society in Britain, and "the whole system of the public credit in this country will receive a fatal shock."[8] Britain's response was to send more and more regular troops to America, until they reached the quite unprecedented level of some twenty thousand, not counting comparable numbers of locally recruited American soldiers. After many setbacks, French North America was conquered. The British later went on the offensive in the West Indies, capturing French islands and, after Spain had entered the war against them, seizing the great Spanish base at Havana in Cuba. In India the cycle of what seemed to the British to be French efforts to curb their trade and of British response repeated itself. The British government sent royal forces to support those of the East India Company. Ministers believed that Asian trade was also much too important to Britain to "suffer it to be diminished, much less lost."[9] Again the British won great successes, ending with the surrender of all the French settlements and the capture of a Spanish one at Manila in the Philippines. The French not only lost their colonies, but their navy suffered severe defeats, and the supremacy achieved by the British navy virtually destroyed French commerce overseas. The global war had been a British triumph.[10]

British ministers had initially hoped that the global war would not spread to Europe. Britain was, however, drawn into a Continental war when France joined a coalition of powers in attacking Britain's ally Prussia. Large subsidies were to be paid to Prussia, and more and more British troops were dispatched to the Continent to fight the French in western Germany as part of an Anglo-German army in British pay. The French, who had begun the war determined, like the British, to avoid European involvement, poured their troops into campaigns in Germany, which were largely unsuccessful. This diversion of French resources into the European war inevitably meant that much less was available for the global war. Hence Pitt could make his claim in what became a famous aphorism that America had been conquered on the plains of Germany.

The outcome of the Seven Years' War seemed to be a clear demonstration that British global supremacy required allies in Europe. Most British ministers accepted this proposition and therefore sought allies after the war. They were unsuccessful. Calls for aligning with Britain against the French peril were largely ignored. Indeed, most European states now believed that they were facing a British peril more potent than any danger from a France so severely humbled by the Seven

Years' War.[11] It was now British hegemony that was to be feared. This indicated that the war had reinforced another lesson: as both Britain and France had come to believe before the war, the wealth accruing from colonies and worldwide trade could have a decisive effect on the relative strength of the western European states. France had certainly learned this lesson. The success of the British in destroying France's navy, capturing its colonies, and disrupting its trade had a very adverse effect on the capacity of France to sustain a war effort, on land as well as at sea. "No more commerce," a French minister wrote in 1758, "consequently no more money, no more circulation. No navy, consequently no resources to resist England."[12] French policy in future was to try to rebuild a navy and then to seize the opportunity of fighting a global war of revenge to cut Britain down to seize. Next time France would not allow itself to be distracted by a war on the Continent. It would concentrate on destroying the British Empire. The Spanish were also hoping to take revenge on Britain for the damage done to them after they had entered the war. Other European states, particularly those with maritime interests, looked on British hegemony after the Seven Years' War with dislike. In their determination to strangle French overseas trade, the British had during the war imposed their own interpretation on what could pass as neutral trade or what could legitimately be seized for supplying the enemy. This high-handedness was very much resented. Britain's wartime ally Prussia had been permanently alienated by the manner in which Britain had terminated the alliance. The British had few friends in Europe.

While realists fully appreciated the contribution of the European war, there had been a popular swing against it and its heavy costs in Britain in the last years of the Seven Years' War. British opinion as a whole was in no doubt that Britain owed its eminence to its navy and the resources the nation derived from long-distance trade and colonies. If alliances were not forthcoming, Britain would have to rely on naval power alone to deter France and Spain from striking back. Some welcomed this prospect. The "dominating discourse" after the Seven Years' War has been described as "deeply naval, colonial and isolationist."[13] Yet for all the bravado about naval power, a lonely eminence with unreconciled enemies planning revenge and with few if any potential allies was recognized to be a vulnerable situation. Britain's response to the perils of eminence without allies was to try to ensure that the global resources that had enabled it to rise to supremacy would be maintained and where possible enhanced. To this end, the North American colonies had to be effectively defended and made to contribute more to the common defense. British regular troops were to be kept in the colonies, taxes were to be levied by Parliament for part of their upkeep, and there was to be stricter enforcement of the regulations known as the Navigation Acts, which were intended to enable Britain fully to profit from colonial trade and especially to ensure that it had the largest possible merchant marine, the foundation of naval power.

The same measures or similar ones were applied to Britain's other overseas dependencies. They too had to trade within the parameters of the Navigation Acts. Nova Scotia, Quebec, and the West Indies also had to pay the duties laid down in the Stamp Act. Parliament did not attempt to tax Ireland, but the Irish parliament

had been paying for a large contingent of British troops since 1699, and in 1769 it was induced to increase the number. British administration in Ireland became more intrusive.[14] The East India Company maintained and paid for its own standing army, reinforced in wartime by regular British units and by the ships of the Royal Navy. In 1781 a settlement was reached whereby the Company would pay for what became a permanent garrison of royal troops in addition to its own greatly increased forces. In 1767 the Company agreed to make an annual contribution to the British exchequer.[15]

American Resources

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the North American colonies probably held pride of place, if only narrowly ahead of the West Indies, in the generally accepted scale of Britain's global interests, both for their own contribution to Britain's wealth and power and for their role in what was a closely linked Atlantic imperial system. There was extensive trade between the thirteen colonies and Ireland, the West Indies, and the North Atlantic fisheries. Hence there were to be dire prophecies at the end of the War of American Independence that with the loss of America, the rest of the British Atlantic empire would unravel.

Accepted doctrine about the importance of the thirteen colonies to Britain was expounded by Adam Anderson of the South Sea Company in 1764 in his *Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce*. Anderson was greatly struck, as were virtually all contemporary commentators, by the "vast increase of their people." Rapid population growth was distinguishing British North America from all other colonial possessions. Not only were the people numerous, but their standard of living was thought to be high. A very productive agriculture meant that the colonies were able, as Anderson put it, to export great quantities of "commodities . . . for our own use, for our manufactures, and re-exportations." Imperial control ensured that colonial exports of items like tobacco and rice that greatly exceeded British consumption still passed through Britain to their ultimate destinations in Europe. Above all, Anderson stressed that Americans consumed British manufactures on a huge scale, so that he estimated that probably about a million people were employed in Britain in producing for the American market. The American trade employed "many hundred of stout ships and many thousands of mariners." "Much wealth, and considerable quantities of both gold and silver [were] continually brought home to us."[16] Modern scholarship fully concurs with contemporary beliefs in the importance of the American market, seeing colonial demand as making necessary or at least hastening some of the technological innovations associated with the Industrial Revolution.[17]

To imperial planners, the populousness of the North American colonies seemed to be a tempting source of military manpower, a commodity in short supply in

Britain itself. British officers tended to be severely critical about the qualities of American soldiers not under their own immediate command, but their potential numbers made them an asset not to be ignored. The colonies had always been expected to undertake their own defense, except in major European wars when their troops were required to fight alongside British regulars. In the Seven Years' War they supplied what were called "provincial" regiments on a massive scale. America also provided soldiers for operations against the colonies of European enemies. Americans were recruited for a succession of ventures into the Caribbean, culminating in the assault on Havana in 1762. In 1745 New England troops won a famous victory when they took the great French fortress of Louisbourg. Perhaps the most striking indication of Britain's reliance on American military manpower lies in the fact that even in the closing years of the War for Independence, the British army's efforts to sustain the war effort depended increasingly on manpower recruited in America.

American Problems

The thirteen mainland colonies with their very high rate of population increase and their obvious prosperity had become an imperial asset of the highest importance. But their success raised problems for Britain, the most urgent of which was that Britain's control over possessions of such importance was fragile. The colonies had evolved within an imperial system in which, in Jack P. Greene's striking formulation, metropolitan authority was "negotiated" rather than imposed.[18] Colonial assemblies had usurped many of the powers assumed to belong to imperial officials, effectively giving the colonies control over their own affairs. The intensity of global great power rivalries and the importance of the contribution that the colonies were now capable of making on Britain's side meant that this was a situation that required correction. The Seven Years' War seemed to have made that clear, no matter how partial and unfair Britain's assessment of what it deemed to be an inadequate colonial contribution might have been Parliament proclaimed its unlimited authority over the colonies and voted taxes that they were to pay. Attempts were made to strengthen the imperial executive though the Townshend duties of 1767 and the remodeling of the government of Massachusetts in 1774. These measures were strongly resisted.

The ideology invoked to justify resistance to imperial authority compounded the problem from Britain's point of view. Parliament was told that it had no right to tax the colonies or to legislate for them because political authority depended on the consent of the governed, and the people of America were not represented at Westminster. Furthermore, Americans were increasingly defining consent in terms that were repugnant to British Whigs. Americans asserted that the people did not authorize their betters to govern for them as they considered best by an act of

consent in the remote past, as was conventional British doctrine; rather, they continued actively to give or withhold their consent, treating those in authority, in John Adams's words, as their "attorneys" and maintaining "a popular check upon the whole government."[19] To members of the House of Lords, this was "a most dangerous doctrine, destructive to all government."[20] Such doctrines appeared even more dangerous when they were enforced by riot and popular disorder. They set a deplorable example to other parts of the empire and to the disaffected in Britain itself.

By 1774 Britain was faced with the unpalatable alternatives of either accepting what had long been the reality, namely that the colonies were largely outside its effective authority, or of imposing its authority on the colonies through armed coercion. To do so was to run the risk of foreign intervention. As early as 1766, there had been prophecies that conflict with the colonies would broaden into war with France and Spain.[21] In the aftermath of Britain's Seven Years' War triumph, those rivals could be expected to seize on American disaffection as the best means of cutting Britain down to size. If international rivalry made a coercive response hazardous, it was also an argument against inaction. Britain's standing as a great power in the eyes of the other European states would be fatally compromised were Britain seen to be unable to impose its will on its own colonies. The king wrote in 1774 that "we must get our colonies into order before we engage with our neighbours." Fortunately for Britain, in 1775 France seemed to be weak and for the moment pacifically inclined. Believing that its greatest imperial rival would be unable or unwilling to exploit the breach between Britain and its American colonies, the government felt that it could act against its rebelling colonies without serious international consequences.[22] Had the revolt been suppressed quickly, the risk might have been justified.

The erosion of imperial authority seemed to be the most urgent American problem facing the British in the years before the Revolution, but the remarkable growth of the colonies gave rise to other anxieties. Although the expansion of their population was largely caused by natural increase, it was aided by immigration. The colonies were attracting a flood of people from the British Isles, especially from Ireland and Scotland. The hemorrhage of population across the Atlantic drew much comment and was generally deplored as weakening Britain, although ministers lacked effective powers to prevent it.[23] An increasing colonial population was pressing for access to new lands. Syndicates of land speculators in both Britain and the colonies were seeking to capitalize on movements of people across the Appalachian Mountains by lobbying for grants to found new colonies in the West. Most official British opinion viewed the territorial expansion of the colonies with misgiving. Far western settlements would raise acute problems of control. They would become virtually independent while certainly plunging Britain into Indian wars and possibly into conflict with the Spanish in Louisiana.

The growth of the colonial economy, which offered Britain so much from increased exports of commodities and greater consumption of British goods, also caused anxieties. In *The Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, Adam Smith wrote that the size of the protected American market was having a distorting effect on Britain's own development, diverting investment from other overseas

markets that were more beneficial to the economy as a whole. "The industry of Great Britain, instead of being accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been principally suited to one great market. . . . But the whole system of her industry and commerce has thereby been rendered less secure; the whole state of her body politic less healthful than it otherwise would have been."[24] Others were concerned that the economies of the northern American colonies would in time cease to be complementary to the British economy and become instead competitors with it. There were indications that this was already happening. The fish caught by New Englanders was competing in southern European markets with English catches. Similarly, New England's shipbuilding industry, which had flourished through the eighteenth century, was competing with British shipbuilders. Many New England–built ships carried colonial produce to Britain and were then sold to British merchants. By the mid-1770s, about one-third of the British merchant fleet was estimated to be American built. It was not therefore difficult to envisage the northern colonies developing into a maritime and commercial force in direct competition with Britain. Would America ultimately also become a manufacturing country able to dispense with imports from Britain? There was much discussion of such a possibility, although inquiries into colonial manufacturing suggested that there was as yet little capacity beyond small-scale production of household goods.

The rapid growth of the colonies made the question of exerting authority over them even more urgent. If they were to be kept within the confines of empire as it was conventionally envisaged, their growth needed to be controlled and directed. Emigration could not be stopped, but the disposal of land could be regulated, westward expansion curbed, and manufacturing ventures checked. Such considerations reinforced pressures to assert imperial authority. Some feared that it might soon be too late. Lurking behind specific anxieties about the growth of the colonies was a more generalized concern that America might be turning into a power that would ultimately be able to rival and even to dominate Britain. Americans certainly believed that the future lay with them and that in due time they would become the senior partner in the British Empire. In 1774 Samuel Adams anticipated that in course of time "the being of the British nation, I mean the being of its importance . . . will depend on her union with America. It requires but a small gift of discernment for any one to foresee that providence will erect a mighty empire in America."[25] Increasing American truculence seemed to be evidence of their ultimate ambitions and of Britain's urgent need to check that ambition. One member of Parliament, for instance, saw America "rising from her subordinate relation to this country, to the undisguised assertion of independence and empire. . . . The moment America is independent she becomes the arbiter of your West Indian trade, and a dangerous rival in many of the other branches of British commerce."[26] Lord Lyttelton, a man noted for his hard-line views on the colonies, urged his countrymen not "to relinquish your domination over these worst of rebels and tamely submit to transfer the seat of empire from Great Britain to America."[27]

Post-war Adjustments

After 1783, British policy-makers had to reassess Britain's position in the world. This they did with perhaps surprising equanimity. Richard Price, the most fervent British supporter of the American cause, mused that "during the war the cry was that our essential interests depended on keeping the colonies. Now it seems to be discover'd that they are of no use to us."[28] As early as November 1783 Silas Deane, once a prominent patriot but now in exile in London, felt that "the loss of America is already forgotten except in some party debates and writings, and there the principal question is, whether on the whole, it be a loss."[29] Many concluded that American independence was indeed no loss. The American colonies had grown too big and diverse to be retained within the empire. So overgrown and fractious a cuckoo was better out of the nest than inside it. The political economist James Anderson argued that the interests of the thirteen colonies and Britain had often diverged, so that the two peoples had not formed "one compacted whole tending toward one object," but had been "an aggregate, consisting of discordant elements" conflicting with one another.[30] The retention of the southern colonies, South Carolina, Georgia, and the Floridas, with their plantation agriculture and close links with the West Indies, would have been welcomed, but the northern colonies, whose competitive economic advantages seemed to be enhanced by the benefits of empire, were another matter. British shipping, fishing, and perhaps in the future even British manufacturing would be better off without their competition within the empire. If American independence led to a decline in British exports, it could be argued that this was not necessarily to Britain's detriment. George Chalmers, a Privy Council official, elaborated on Adam Smith's doubts about the benefits to Britain of privileged access to colonial markets. Because it had "debilitated other branches of traffic, . . . the extent of our colony commerce became a deplorable evil," of which Britain was well rid.[31] Politically as well as economically, Britain seemed to be better off without America. The radical interpretations of Whig ideology, that in the colonies had evolved into overt republicanism, seemed to preclude America's remaining in an empire whose supreme authority was the king-in-Parliament. So long as any connection remained with the American colonies, Josiah Tucker, Anglican cleric and writer on economic topics, warned in 1776 that the Americans would try to subvert the British people. Only separation could arrest "the contagion of republicanism."[32]

The failures of the war stimulated not only reassessments of the future of Britain's empire, but also called in question the balance that Britain should try to maintain in future between its global and its European priorities. Conclusions were generally that Europe had been unduly neglected. "America had been lost for want of a continental war in Germany," the Whig leader Charles Fox said in 1787.[33] William Knox, an official deeply involved in American affairs before and during the war, blamed some ministers for avoiding "all connexion with the continental powers" after 1763 under what he called "the delusion" that Britain could be "the supreme maritime

power" on its own. In his view, Britain could not hope to match the combined naval strength of France and Spain. His preferred solution was the radical one that France need not be considered a permanent foe, but that Britain should try to come to terms with the French and form an alliance. Failing that, Britain must seek other Continental allies. Although he strongly advocated a more active role in Europe, Knox, like most of his contemporaries, had no doubt of the continuing importance of global commerce, which is "the great means of political strength and the peculiar source of that branch of it which consists in a naval force."[34]

Although British governments pursued European alliances more purposefully after 1783, there was no rejection of Britain's worldwide involvement or, even if the thirteen colonies had broken out of the empire, of overseas empire in general. Colonies were still thought to be the main source of the wealth on which rested Britain's status as a great power and its capacity to exert influence in Europe.

In its later stages, the War of American Independence, from the British point of view, became a war primarily to preserve Britain's remaining imperial assets rather than to subjugate the thirteen colonies. It was fought above all in the West Indies, to which troops were switched from the mainland; at sea, notably off Gibraltar, which was successfully defended; and in India, where warships and regular regiments were deployed in increasing numbers. In all these areas the British held their own, although it required a great naval victory in 1782 to reverse a succession of losses in the West Indies. After the peace, Britain consolidated its grip on what it had been able to defend.

In the process of taking its flight from the imperial nest, the American cuckoo trashed the nest less badly than many Britons had feared that it would. American attempts to conquer Quebec failed. Even though many French Canadians may have inclined toward the American cause, few of them were willing actively to endorse it. The emigration of American loyalists to Nova Scotia and Quebec helped to cement British imperial control after the war. The American War put British authority in Ireland under great strain. Ireland contributed men and provisions for the British army in America in large numbers, but the pressures of the war stimulated a powerful Irish patriot movement. Outside the north of Ireland, where there was much sympathy for America among Presbyterians, Irish patriots tended to have their own agenda, based on the recovery of their historic rights, rather than an American one. The patriot movement was, however, very formidable. Its armed Volunteers were able to coerce the British government in 1782 into formally recognizing that under the British Crown the Irish parliament was equal rather than subordinate to that of Britain.[35] Much of the ground ceded in 1782 was, however, quickly recovered. The Irish parliament might be nominally independent, but it was elected by a very small electorate and was still in reality controlled by the British administration. Further reforms were resisted. The British West Indies suffered severely in the war. Most of the supplies from the continent on which the islands had become dependent were cut off, and the French seized many of the British colonies. British officials suspected that many West Indian whites were sympathetic to the Americans, but leading figures in the islands were much more

closely integrated into British society than those on the mainland had ever been, and independence had no appeal for them.[36] After the war, West Indian plantation agriculture quickly recovered and was to expand rapidly in the 1780s and 1790s. The West Indies resumed its place as the greatest of British imperial assets. India, where Britain maintained its position during the war against both European and Indian enemies, was also highly valued, both for itself and for the great China trade that empire in India underpinned. In India "perhaps the future existence of Great Britain as an independent, at any rate as a respectable power" was at stake, a British minister wrote in 1784.[37] Although increasing British emphasis on India is often seen as part of a move toward a second British Empire in the East to replace the first one that had been lost with American independence, this is by no means the case. Empire in India was firmly established and highly valued well before the American crisis, and Britain certainly did not relinquish its imperial designs around the Atlantic.

Independent America still had a prominent part in Britain's Atlantic concerns. Duties were reduced on direct trade between Britain and America so that British manufactures could recover their American markets and to enable Britain to remain the entrepôt for distributing American commodities throughout Europe. Immediately after the war Britain did indeed regain its position as the provider of by far the largest share of American imports. American trade with Britain's colonies was, however, restricted. Had Lord Shelburne, the minister who made peace with America, remained in office, an independent America would have continued to enjoy free trade with Britain's colonies. Those who succeeded Shelburne believed, however, that if America could not be retained as a subordinate member of the empire under proper control, it must be excluded from its trade. A privileged outsider would be an intolerable source of weakness. Imperial trades, above all that with the West Indies, which the Americans valued so highly, were to be reserved for British ships. Those who designed this policy after the war were determined to give the British shipping industry protection from American competition, which had been impossible so long as America remained within the empire. Putting a brake on the growth of America as a future maritime power was part of their agenda.[38]

Continuities in British Policy

Britain's view of its position in the world and of the strategies needed to maintain that position remained more or less constant throughout the eighteenth century. Britain was a European power, and ultimately its primary interests were in Europe. To maintain and advance these interests, Britain had to be actively involved in European affairs, but it was also a global power with worldwide commitments. So long as its main rivals were other western European maritime powers, the wealth that Britain derived from its worldwide commercial and colonial interests and

its powerful navy did much to make the British formidable in Europe. Overseas resources must therefore be protected and developed to their fullest extent.

Largely because of their dynamic population growth, the thirteen American colonies rose to a dominant position in Britain's worldwide assets by the middle of the eighteenth century, so much so that Britain fought one war to protect them, from 1754 to 1763, and another to try to impose effective control over them, from 1775 to 1783. The second war proved to be unwinnable, and large sections of British opinion came to the view that it had not been worth fighting. The loss of a very significant part of its empire did not, however, change British global strategies. Britain continued to do its utmost to protect and augment its extra-European resources in order to safeguard its position in Europe. In the 1790s Britain tried to check what it took to be the hegemonic designs of revolutionary France in much the same way that it had resisted those of the French monarchy in the Seven Years' War: a large proportion of Britain's resources was again deployed outside Europe in protecting Britain's own colonies and in trying to cripple France's war effort by capturing French colonies and disrupting French overseas trade. With or without an American empire, Britain pursued its objectives with remarkable consistency, both as to ends and means.

Notes

1. Daniel Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War, 1754 to 1763* (London: Longman, 2011), 1.
2. The classic account of contemporary debates is Richard Pares, "American versus Continental Warfare," in Pares, *The Historian's Business and Other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 130–172.
3. Marie Peters, "The Myth of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Great Imperialist: 1. Pitt and Imperial Expansion, 1738–1763," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 21 (2003): 31–74.
4. Daniel A. Baugh, "Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689–1815," *International History Review* 10 (1988): 33–58.
5. Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714 to 1783* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 3.
6. Daniel A. Baugh, "Withdrawing from Europe: Anglo-French Maritime Geopolitics, 1750–1800," *International History Review* 20 (1998): 13–16.
7. Letter of Duke of Newcastle, September 5, 1754, cited in P. J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750–1783* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 83.
8. Letter of T. Robinson, August 29, 1755, ibid., 82.
9. Letter of Lord Holdernesse, January 24, 1754, ibid., 84–85.
10. Baugh's excellent *Global Seven Years War* can now be added to the fine recent account by Fred Anderson, *The Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000).
11. See the admirable account of British foreign policy by H. M. Scott, *British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
12. Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 449.

13. Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat*, 514–515.

14. M. J. Powell, *Britain and Ireland in the Eighteenth-Century Crisis of Empire* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

15. Marshall, *Making and Unmaking of Empires*, chap. 7.

16. Adam Anderson, *An Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce, From the Earliest Accounts to the Present Time*, 2 vols. (London, printed for A. Millar et al., 1764), 2: xv.

17. Jacob M. Price, "The Imperial Economy, 1700–1776," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 2, *The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 99.

18. Jack P. Greene, *Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994).

19. Clarendon to Pym [January 27, 1766], in *Papers of John Adams*, ed. Robert J. Taylor et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–), 1: 168.

20. R. C. Simmons and P. D. G. Thomas, eds., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliament Respecting North America, 1774–1783*, 6 vols. (Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1982–1986), 2: 334.

21. Speech of H. S. Conway, February 21, 1766, in Simmons and Thomas, *Proceedings and Debates*, 2: 281.

22. Scott, *British Foreign Policy*, 195, 204–205.

23. Bernard Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: Emigration from Britain to America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).

24. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, bk. 4, chap. 7, pt. iii.Edwin Cannan ed., 2 vols (London: Methuen, 1961), 2: 119.

25. S. Adams to Arthur Lee, April 4, 1774, in *The Life of Arthur Lee, LLD*, ed. R. H. Lee, 2 vols. (Boston**:** Wells & Lilly, 1829), 2: 213–214.

26. John Dyke Acland, October 26, 1775, in Simmons and Thomas, *Proceedings and Debates*, 6:94–95.

27. Speech in House of Lords, November 10, 1775, ibid., 6: 228.

28. Richard Price to Lansdowne, October 29, 1785, in *The Correspondence of Richard Price*, 3 vols., ed. D. O. Thomas and W. Bernard Peach (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, and Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1983–1994), 2: 318.

29. Silas Deane to Simeon Deane, November 3, 1783, in "The Deane Papers," vol. 5, *Collections of the New York Historical Society for 1890* (New York: New York Historical Society, 1891), 226.

30. James Anderson, *The Interest of Great Britain with Regard to her American Colonies Considered* (London, T Cadell, 1782), 35–36.

31. George Chalmers, *Opinions on Interesting Subjects of Public Law and Commercial Policy arising from American Independence* (London, J. Debrett, 1784), 115.

32. Josiah Tucker, *A Series of Answers to Certain Popular Objections, against Separating from the Rebellious Colonies, and Discarding them Altogether* (Gloucester, T. Cadell, 1776), 72–73.

33. J. Debrett, ed., *The Parliamentary Register*, 45 vols. (London, 1780–1796), 23: 75.

34. William Knox to William Eden, January 7, 1786, in Knox MSS, 7: 26, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

35. Vincent Morley, *Irish Opinion and the American Revolution, 1760–1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) is a welcome addition to the older standard accounts, Maurice O'Connell, *Irish Politics and Social Conflict in the Age of the American Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), and

R. B. McDowell, *Ireland in the Age of Imperialism and Revolution, 1760–1801* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

36. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).

37. Lord Carmarthen to Duke of Dorset, July 9, 1784, The National Archives, Kew, London, FO 27/12, f. 149.

38. See P. J. Marshall, *Remaking the British Atlantic: The United States and the British Empire after American Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Charles R. Ritcheson, *Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy towards the United States, 1783–1795* (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969).

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CHAPTER 2

THE UNSETTLED PERIPHERY: THE BACKCOUNTRY ON THE EVE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

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In early May 1774, Daniel Greathouse, a white settler on Yellow Creek about forty miles north of present-day Wheeling, West Virginia, invited four Mingo acquaintances from across the river to drink with him and his friends. After the two Mingo women and two men became intoxicated, Greathouse and his accomplices murdered and scalped their Indian guests. When two Mingos came to investigate the commotion, Greathouse murdered them as well. The killers then went on a rampage, ambushing six Indians in a canoe, executing several, and invading an Indian camp, where they killed a young mother. They eventually seized and slaughtered several members of the family of Logan, the locally well-known and respected Iroquois-born Mingo warrior and orator. The murderers committed their barbarous crimes during a cycle of escalating Indian-white violence in the region, in which each side carried out revenge killings. In the ensuing months, Logan launched a series of vengeful slayings in the Monongahela Valley in southwestern Pennsylvania, not only in retaliation for the brutal murders of his family members, but also in revenge for the earlier executions of neighboring Shawnee and Delaware traders and their family members.[1]

Although Logan pledged initially to target Virginians only, his and his warriors' rage spilled over to other white settlers living in the area. However, as is so often the case, the violence yielded unintended consequences. The Indians' raids gave what one Virginia surveyor called "the Oppertunty we hav So long wished for": an excuse to crush and remove from present-day western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and most of Kentucky—the backcountry—Shawnees, Mingos, Delawares, and other Ohio Valley Indians, whom white colonists regarded as a troublesome impediment to their annexation and settlement of western lands. With the defeat of the Indians, white farm families and land speculators believed they could rightly claim, settle, develop, or even sell these cheap, bountiful lands. However, one unforeseen obstacle—the British government—threatened to stand in the way. Parliament and the Privy Council approved a series of acts designed to control white infiltration onto Indian lands. The Proclamation of 1763 sought to place a permanent boundary between white and native America by restricting white settlements to the east of the Appalachian Mountains and Indian communities to the west. The Quebec Act (June 1774) similarly declared Quebec—which at the time included most of present-day Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio—off-limits to white deed holders, settlers, and speculators. Ultimately, however, Parliament's actions were too little, too late. At the time of the Yellow Creek killings, white settlers and speculators had already begun laying claim to southwestern Quebec, otherwise known as the Ohio country.[2]

Lord Dunmore, the new royal governor of Virginia, perhaps seeking to ingratiate himself to Virginia's wealthy land-speculating elites or to increase his own fortune, seized the moment. Without royal authorization, he organized a twenty-four-hundred-man militia and appointed John Connolly, a Pittsburgh magistrate, to lead the force. Dunmore himself led troops across the Ohio River to lay waste to several Shawnee and Mingo villages. With the defeat of the Shawnees at the battle at Point Pleasant (where the Ohio and Kanawha rivers meet in present-day West Virginia) in October 1774, the Shawnees sued for peace.[3]

Historians have long debated the significance of Lord Dunmore's War. Some see it as an epilogue to the Seven Years' War, a final act that brought down the curtain on an unsuccessful, decade-long British struggle to administer and control the backcountry. British major general Frederick Haldimand voiced this perspective when he fretted in 1773 that little could be done about the steady stream of white settlers swarming onto western lands. In his opinion, they threatened "a great many inconveniences," among them the further alienation of local Indians and the possibility that these remote settlements "will soon be the asylum of the lawless." By the early 1770s, the Crown, weakened by debt incurred during the Seven Years' War, could do little to impede white encroachment on Indian lands.[4] Other historians regard Dunmore's campaign as a prologue to the American Revolution, a dress rehearsal by soldier-farmers whose goals were and would remain self-reliance and self-determination— both of which hinged on land ownership. Dunmore's campaign, according to the latter interpretation, thus aided and legitimized colonists'

pursuit of property by supporting and encouraging white intrusion onto Indian lands. With Dunmore's support, American militiamen at once asserted their ideal of freedom and affirmed their appetite for land.[5]

Although both interpretations are useful, they do leave open a number of additional lines of analysis. Whether Dunmore's War represented a last gasp of a tottering British imperial order or the early rumblings of patriot ascendency, it seems clear that the westward pressure of colonial populations was a fundamental fact of mid-eighteenth-century North American life. It also seems clear that the character of that pressure changed dramatically after the Seven Years' War. Before the war, the Crown, colonial officials, officials in New France, and Indian headmen and their communities had all combined to temper the unbridled and unsanctioned private acquisition of western land. Moreover, colonial officials tried to rectify Indian complaints of white land swindles by nullifying fraudulent purchases, removing squatters, and by polishing covenanted chains of friendship, mutual respect, and support. After the Seven Years' War, this system of transnational governance broke down. It left in its wake a period of astonishing internecine violence, as white settlers fought to displace Indians and as Indians responded in kind. The horrific nature of much of this violence raises yet another question: did white settlers attack native peoples solely as a means of acquiring their land? Given the scope and intensity of the violence, such an explanation hardly seems plausible, especially when so much of the violence seemed indiscriminate, often directed at people with no particular claim to desired lands. Historians have offered a number of compelling explanations for this frontier bloodshed. Some have attributed it to white anti-Indian prejudice or racism, while others have suggested it was an expression of latent class tensions within and among white colonists.[6]

These are merely a sampling of the compelling explanations historians have offered for the collapse of order in western Pennsylvania, the Ohio country, and along the Appalachian spine. Regardless, whatever the explanation for the intensity of white anti-Indian violence, whatever the significance of Dunmore's War, one fact remains: Great Britain's victory over France in the Seven Years' War unleashed a wave of white westward migration as colonists took advantage of the power vacuum left by the collapse of France's empire in North America. Britain would act to contain that westward expansion, but its efforts would ultimately be in vain. Rather than curtailing the migration of colonists and the attendant violence, government policy merely angered westward-looking colonists and eastward-looking Indians, and added fuel to the Revolutionary movement.

The Backcountry as a Mixed Multitude

By the middle decades of the eighteenth century, the backcountry of British North America constituted that region that lay to the west of the crest of the Appalachian Mountains, stretching from western New England, down east-central New

York, to the western edges of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, and incorporating the Great Lakes, the Ohio River Valley, and the Mississippi River Valley. It was predominantly Indian country. Abenakis, the Six Nations of the Iroquois, and Delawares, Shawnees, Mingos, Wyandots, Cherokees, Catawbas, and Creeks either lived or hunted in this region. Some lived in multiethnic refugee communities, while others lived in villages inhabited primarily by people of their tribe or nation. While native traditions informed the daily life of Indians in this region, an international trade network stitched together the backcountry. European traders, whose caravans were generally manned by black slaves and white servants, brought European manufactured goods to Indian villages. There, they traded housewares, textiles, tools, firearms, and whiskey for beaver pelts and deerskins. Most native peoples had grown so accustomed to, if not dependent on, Euro-American goods that by the mid-eighteenth century, much of the material distinction that had once distinguished native peoples from their nonnative neighbors had disappeared.[7]

White hunters and farm families also lived in the periphery. The former, now barely distinguishable from Indians in habits and dress, ventured out on expeditions that lasted months at a time in search of pelts and furs. The farmers, which included subsistence and small-market cultivators, raised livestock and grew corn, barley, wheat, oats, rye, hemp, and flax for market. Additionally, small commercial enterprises that produced lumber, naval stores, and potash augmented the patchwork economy of the backcountry. The economic value of this region to England rivaled that of the eastern seaboard and even some of Britain's holdings in the Caribbean.

The steady exchange of material goods transformed the backcountry into a veritable Rabelaisian world of multiple cultures, languages, ethnicities, faiths, and races. By the 1750s, Mohawk and Oneida communities in eastern Iroquoia were virtually surrounded by Palatine (German), Dutch, English, and Irish communities. Palatines, who had arrived in the Hudson Valley of New York in the early eighteenth century to produce naval stores for the Crown, wished to farm for themselves. In 1732, Cadwallader Colden, New York's surveyor general, claimed that just having the opportunity to "avoid the dependence on landlords, and to enjoy lands in fee to descend to their posterity" induced many Europeans to come to America. Most Palatine families, according to one immigrant, came to the colony of New York for that very reason: "to secure lands for our children on which they will be able to support themselves after we die."[8] The Palatines quickly left the Hudson Valley and established themselves on farms and in communities, at the behest of the Mohawks, in the Schoharie River Valley. Some Palatine farm families even worked as tenants on Mohawk farms. So mutually respectful were they that German and Mohawk communities within sight of each other coexisted peacefully for decades. Likewise, Dutch villages and farmsteads had long existed within easy commute of Indian villages. Baptized Mohawks routinely attended services at Dutch and Palatine churches, most notably for baptisms and marriages. Additionally, English and Irish families, encouraged by William Johnson, the Indian agent, settled and

farmed in and around the community of Warrensbush near the Mohawk town of Tiononderoge. By the 1740s, the Mohawk Valley stood as one of the most ethnically diverse regions of British North America.

Ethnic and racial diversity also characterized backcountry communities like Chillicothe and Pickaweeke in the Ohio country. Shawnees made up the majority of the native residents in these towns, but they also shared their towns, their homes, and their beds with English traders, some of whom had lived in Indian towns for years. Many of these men were married to either native women or to white women who had been raised by Indians. Most white traders there were not fluent in local native languages, and so they often relied on the language skills of free or enslaved blacks who lived either among or near Indians. Most Africans in the backcountry were enslaved to white farmers and traders, and to Indians. A number of black runaways and slaves stolen during Indian raids on white communities lived in Indian villages—a number significant enough for colonial officials to make regular pleas for their return. Some blacks lived in the periphery as freemen and freewomen running farms and taverns. Others performed important functions as translators and mediators between Indians, settlers, and British officials. Andries Van Patten, for example, a Dutch settler in Mohawk country, could not speak a word of Mohawk and thus, when engaged in discussions with Mohawk headmen, had to rely on his "Negro Wench" to translate from Dutch to Mohawk. The Sun Fish was a man who identified situationally in Iroquoia: when in Seneca country, his home, he identified and was identified as Seneca; when in English territory, such as when reporting intelligence to Sir William Johnson, he identified and was identified as Negro. Free and enslaved Africans could be found in the backcountry from Vermont to Georgia, as well as on the far western periphery. In the French farming and trading communities of Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Chartres in Illinois country there lived over five hundred French men, women, and children; four hundred and forty-five black slaves; and one hundred and forty-seven Indian slaves. The percentage of black slaves to the region's overall population rivaled that of eighteenth-century Virginia.[9]

To the south of Iroquoia and the colony of New York, Indians, whites, and blacks co-existed in the backcountry of Pennsylvania as well. However, in some ways, this coexistence was much more tenuous. Part of the explanation rests with the answer to the question "Who owned the land?" In New York, colonial authorities and backcountry settlers acknowledged native sovereignty over the land. In Pennsylvania, competing interests lay claim to the backcountry west of the Susquehanna River. The Penn family; the Six Nations Iroquois; local Shawnees, Delawares, and Susquehanna Indians; even the colony of Virginia, all claimed sovereignty over this region. Because ownership of the land was so contested, Palatine, Irish, and Scots-Irish families who could not get title to land routinely squatted on small plots, hoping that their improvements of the land would render them the rightful owners of it. Moravian farmers settled in the Lehigh Valley and tried to convert the Delawares to their faith, all the while keeping them at arm's length. Indians, whites, and blacks intermingled freely but guardedly. Still,

they exchanged goods, farmed together, traveled together, prayed together, and drank together. Soon, however, Indian complaints about white squatters reached the Pennsylvania proprietors, who implemented a number of measures to try to rectify matters. They removed white squatters from the region, burning their cabins in hopes that they would not return. They also sought to buy land from the Iroquois so that squatters could become legitimate smallholders. Conrad Weiser, the principal agent for the Pennsylvania proprietors, negotiated fraudulently and aggressively with the Iroquois to expand the holdings of the proprietors, and to enrich himself in the process. White settlers and native inhabitants interacted so closely into the mid-1750s that when hostilities broke out between them, white settlers felt betrayed, shocked that the Indians did not regard them as good neighbors. However, Indian orators, including Teedyuscung, identified the problem for them: "The Land is the Cause of our Differences; that is, our being unhappily turned out of the land is the cause" of Indian attacks on white farmsteads in Pennsylvania's backcountry.[10]

Even in those regions of the backcountry where Indians and black slaves did not constitute a significant presence, difference and division existed. In what would become the state of Vermont, for example, poor farm families mainly from Connecticut and Massachusetts took advantage of political confusion, miscommunication, and governmental indecision to settle land to which the colonies of New York and New Hampshire claimed title. As farm families moved into the area, commonly known as the New Hampshire Grants, Abenaki inhabitants and Mohawk hunters moved out. Hard-luck colonists as well as wealthy proprietors purchased land grants cheaply from New Hampshire's Governor Wentworth, who profited through kickbacks. Some Vermonters sought to establish themselves on farms, while others intended only to speculate. Like many newcomers, Ethan Allen, leader of a pro–New Hampshire faction of settlers known as the Green Mountain Boys, did both. The ninety-five acres he purchased in Salisbury for five hundred pounds with the intention of improving it, and the four hundred acres in Poultney he bought under Wentworth's land-grant scheme, for a mere four pounds—the equivalent of one right, or share, in a multi-purchaser land-investment transaction—with the intent of selling it, represent just two of Allen's many land acquisitions. Because confusion reigned over which colony owned the region between the Connecticut River and Lake Champlain, and because New York proprietors and other investors rejected the legitimacy of many of the grants and rights held by settlers and speculators, tensions arose that foreshadowed the American Revolution. The clearest expression of this tension was the actions of Allen and his Green Mountain Boys, who terrorized Vermonters inclined to submit to New York's jurisdiction. The great proprietors of New York, as well as the New York Council, branded the Green Mountain Boys as "outlaws," as "riotous and disorderly," and as "revolutionaries." The Green Mountain Boys labeled the colony of New York "tyrant," and in contrast claimed themselves to be peace-loving opponents of tyranny and loyal Britons, who would nevertheless "defend their persons and properties, from the cruelty and monopoly of their rulers."[11]

If a mixed multitude of Indians, blacks, and white settlers, squatters, and proprietors characterized the northern backcountry, then from a white, elite perspective, at least, "a mix'd Medley from all Countries and the Off Scouring of America" constituted the Carolinas. While getting settled in his backcountry parish in South Carolina in 1766, itinerant Anglican minister Charles Woodmason took stock of the inhabitants there: "The People around, of abandon'd Morals and profligate Principles—Rude—Ignorant—Void of Manners, Education or Good Breeding—No genteel or Polite Person among them[;] The people are of all Sects and Denominations." To Woodmason, an educated planter, merchant, clerk, and local officeholder turned minister, the people of his parish, like "the whole Body of the People in these back Parts," were a thievish, poor, lazy, "loose, dissolute, Idle People—Without either Religion or Goodness," who drank habitually and lived "like Hogs."[12] J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur shared Woodmason's prejudices: "back-settlers of both the Carolinas, Virginia, and many other parts," he argued, had long been "a set of lawless people" because they lived "beyond the reach of government."[13] Woodmason, Crèvecoeur, and other commentators believed that want defined the lives of settlers in the periphery. The lack of good government, of proper churches, of refinement, and a general absence of basic education, of industry, and even of hope rendered these settlers people of despair. Nearly all who flocked to the backcountry were landless, luckless, and in search of new beginnings. They wanted what those who flocked to Vermont or to the Pennsylvania backcountry or to Iroquoia or to Illinois country wanted: "to give each [of their children]…a farm" so that they may become "good substantial independent American farmers." What most found, at least in the minds of observers such as Crèvecouer and Woodmason, was misery and misfortune.[14]

The Impact of War on the "Country Between"

Among the more disruptive consequences of the Seven Years' War were the dramatic shifts in British Indian policy. For the most part, English-Indian political relations had previously taken a kind of patchwork approach, driven largely by the government's desire to thwart French advances in North America. In practice, this meant a generally conciliatory attitude toward Indians, as the government struggled to maintain alliances in the face of a French enemy itself seeking to cement Indian allegiance. Now with the French expelled from North America, British policy came to rest on a new pillar: instead of countering French aggression, the desire to keep the peace in the backcountry drove British decision making. The government well knew that the expense of a massive peacekeeping force in the North American backcountry would make servicing its mountainous wartime

debt nearly impossible. Mindful of the dilemma and distrustful of Indians, many of whom had allied themselves with the French, General Jeffery Amherst, the newly appointed commander in chief of the British army in North America, believed that the British government no longer needed to be concerned with fostering good relations with Indian allies. Indians needed to be governed, he reasoned, not coddled. Amherst arrived at this position when South Carolina's backcountry exploded in what came to be termed the Cherokee War (1760–1761). The roots of the war lay in the murder of thirty Cherokee warriors by backcountry whites. Custom dictated that the Cherokees seek revenge by killing an equal number of whites. At this point, Governor William Lyttelton suspended one of the long-standing arrangements of British-Cherokee relations: the free distribution of shot and gunpowder. He promised to make the vital commodities available again once the Indians surrendered the perpetrators of the revenge killings. Lyttelton further insulted the Cherokees after imprisoning several headmen who had come to Charleston to negotiate the release of powder. Cherokee warriors responded by launching a series of devastating raids on forts and communities from Virginia to Georgia, which resulted in great loss of life on both sides. In January 1761, Amherst issued orders "to chastise [the Cherokee and] reduce them to the absolute necessity of suing for pardon." This the British commander accomplished effectively that summer by burning down all fifteen towns that constituted the Cherokee's Middle Towns, destroying their fields, and executing any Cherokee man, woman, or child who got in the way. Amherst was determined to govern the Indians by reducing them to total submission.[15]

To this end, Amherst instituted a key change to Britain's Indian policy: he ordered a halt to what he considered "purchasing the good behavior of Indians" through presents. Amherst also followed Lyttelton's example and sharply limited the distribution of gunpowder and shot. For Indians, the latter represented a gross violation of the terms of their friendship with Britain, and they soon struck back, unsettling the periphery in what one historian has called "the first war of independence."[16]

The first clear sign of broad native resistance to Amherst's policy surfaced in 1762 when the Delaware prophet Neolin preached a vision. He revealed to his brethren that they could revitalize and rebalance their world by rejecting all things Euro-American, especially manufactured goods such as clothing, guns, and alcohol. By doing so, they would, among other things, ensure the return of game driven away by European trade and settlement. Other Indians acted on Neolin's teachings by engaging in an uncoordinated mass movement of resistance and rebellion in an effort to dislodge white settlers and soldiers from the backcountry. From April to October 1763, the Ottawa war chief Pontiac lay siege to the British fort at Detroit, while warriors elsewhere attacked forts from the Great Lakes to the Pennsylvania frontier. In response, Amherst vowed to expunge Indians from nearby white settlements by any means necessary, even if that meant using germ warfare (pox-infected blankets).

British officials in England realized that drastic measures had to be taken to quell what historians have often referred to eponymously as "Pontiac's Rebellion."

In October 1763, the Board of Trade issued the proclamation that divided North America into Indian and colonial spheres, separated by the spine of the Appalachian Mountains. With the proclamation, the Board of Trade nullified speculators' existing claims to land west of the proclamation line, and implemented new and terrifically cumbersome procedures for the approval of any subsequent land claims west of the line. To curtail usurious and corrupt trade practices, the board now also required all traders to be licensed. Finally, to restore some measure of trust between Indian allies and the government, it would abandon Amherst's failed policies and begin again the free distribution of gifts and supplies.

While the Crown hoped the proclamation would put an end to unrest in the backcountry, the unintended consequence was more racial violence, further divestment of Indian lands, and growing anger, resentment, and distrust of white backcountry settlers and speculators toward their provincial governments. Many colonial Americans living in the backcountry believed that their government cared more about protecting the lives of Indians than safeguarding the rights of British subjects. They wanted their government to punish the Indians for their transgressions, not reward them.

Regulating the Backcountry

Many Scots-Irish farmers in Paxton, Pennsylvania, near present-day Harrisburg, shared a common belief that their provincial government cared little about them. The legislators had done almost nothing, in their opinion, to pursue and punish those Indians involved in recent attacks, some of which were in fact quite gruesome. Indians "butchered" the bodies of some farmers, had "roasted" one woman, and had pierced most bodies with awls, pitchforks, and arrows. In December 1763, a mob from Paxton, believing they could get no redress from provincial authorities, mutilated nearly two dozen peaceful Conestoga Indians, some living near Paxton, others huddled in protective custody in the nearby Lancaster jail. To some eastern observers like Benjamin Franklin, this violence was racially motivated; the murdered Christian Indians prayed like Englishmen, dressed like Englishmen, lived like Englishmen, and took English names. However, they had "reddish brown skin, and black Hair," and thus were not white. Perhaps if men with "freckled Face[s] and red Hair" had laid siege to forts and raided farmsteads, Franklin jibed, then one might be justified in "killing all the freckled red-haired Men, Women, and Children" in revenge.[17] The so-called Paxton Boys were not amused. In February 1764 they marched on Philadelphia to present their grievances. Although the mob was turned back from Germantown by British troops, citizen volunteers, and Franklin, the Paxton Boys registered their complaints: the five counties that constituted Pennsylvania's backcountry were woefully underrepresented in the Provincial Assembly (ten seats versus Philadelphia's and its neighboring counties'

twenty-six); the colonial leadership, especially the Quakers, had ignored their needs during the late war while helping Indians, spending private and public monies through the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures (1756); and finally, the colonial leaders had failed to relieve the suffering of white refugees after the war. The Paxton Boys had transferred their rage at colonial elites, especially the proprietors of the Susquehanna Company, which claimed ownership over much of the land in the region, onto innocent Indians. They blamed the government for exercising arbitrary power over them, blamed the Indians for denying them their right to a life of peace and freedom, and blamed the company for restricting their access to choice land.[18]

Backcountry settlers in the Carolinas also expressed their rage to colonial officials who seemed deaf and blind to their needs. "Regulators"—vigilante groups who, feeling oppressed, neglected, and exploited by others, some of whom they deemed their betters, others their inferiors, banded together to seek redress through petitions, acts of resistance, and mob violence—stood at the center of turmoil in the backcountry of both North and South Carolina. Like mobs to the east, which carried an extra-constitutional legitimacy because of the lack of local mechanisms for achieving redress, Regulators believed they had the right to bring about law and order on their own terms. The definition of "order" differed in the two colonies: in North Carolina, order meant making local government more responsive to the needs of yeoman farmers by replacing wealthy, corrupt local officials with fair-minded husbandmen; in South Carolina, it meant a rising class of vigilante backcountry planters cleansing the countryside of gangs of rootless, landless men, whom they branded as outlaws and thieves, in order to secure their own private property. Although Regulators in both colonies may have seen themselves as oppressed citizens, whose rights government ignored, the two provincial governments viewed them as proto-revolutionaries with the potential to overthrow the established order.[19]

The rise of the Regulator movement in North Carolina (1766–1771) was rooted in escalating tensions in the backcountry between wealthy local elites (anti-Regulators), who abused their power, and indebted poor and middling farmers (Regulators), who felt plagued by the heavy taxes and fees imposed on them by sheriffs, court clerks, and lawyers. The short-lived Sandy Creek Association, a local pre-Regulators organization of disaffected farmers, first voiced these and other grievances in 1766. Perhaps the most egregious practice to them included the auctioning off of property belonging to debtors. In 1768, Herman Husband, a radical Protestant and middling farmer with rising aspirations, who believed that land reform and religious reform ought to go hand in hand, organized former supporters of the Sandy Creek Association into a new organization, whose purpose was to regulate "publick Grievances and abuses of Power." Members of the new regulatory group sought relief from what they considered excessive and unlawful taxes, some of which provincial officials pocketed as their pay. Unlawful taxes, they reasoned, infringed on their happiness by devaluing their labor and taking their property without due process. Voting corrupt officials out of office and replacing them with trusted local farmers was a key goal of the North Carolina Regulators.[20]

Over the next two years, the Regulators enjoyed minimal success. Husband and other Regulators were elected to the assembly and, thus, gave voice and body to Regulators' petitions. However, the assembly, preoccupied with Parliament's "unconstitutional and illegal" excesses (Townshend tariffs), largely ignored the complaints of the colony's backcountry farmers. When members of the assembly signed a nonimportation agreement late in 1769—the last colony to do so—Governor William Tryon closed the assembly, which merely stiffened the resolve of the Regulators. They refused openly to pay their taxes and confronted directly the local elites they believed to be thwarting their political will. In response, the assembly passed a series of conciliatory reforms, but in a fashion typical of many colonial officials, it also passed the 1771 Riot Act, which authorized Governor Tryon to raise a militia against any popular gathering he deemed a threat to the public peace.[21]

Tryon tested his new powers in May 1771 when he led just under twelve hundred troops and western militiamen against as many as three thousand Regulators at Alamance. Tryon's forces, which suffered about seventy casualties, defeated the Regulators, who suffered nearly twice as many losses. Several leaders of the Regulators were arrested, tried, and hanged. The vast majority, however, were acquitted and were forced to sign oaths of allegiance. Although this defeat effectively ended the Regulator movement in North Carolina, it did not bring an end to the kinds of grievances the Regulators raised. Hence, once North Carolina achieved its independence from Great Britain, reforms dear to Regulators—now *patriots*—found their way into the state's new constitution. The new state would now hold free and frequent elections; it would sanction only trials by a jury of one's peers; and it tolerated no sacrifice of due process before the law. These were just a few of the provisions of the new constitution entirely consistent with the Regulators' goals.[22]

In South Carolina, the nature and outcome of the Regulation movement was very different. South Carolina's backcountry erupted after the Seven Years' War partly out of class tensions but largely because of chaos and disorder, resulting in violence among white settlers. One court of law existed in the colony—in Charleston, too great a distance and too difficult a journey from the backcountry for any of the Regulators to attempt redress there. Most South Carolinian Regulators were landowners with aspirations of becoming great planters. Protecting their families and property from outlaws, who were primarily landless white men displaced by the Cherokee War and who lived by hunting, robbing, and pillaging, lay at the heart of their concerns. One Regulator bemoaned the fact that every time he and his allies got a little money together and went to town to purchase slaves, their "Houses are beset, and Robbers plunder Us, even of our Cloaths," not to mention their horses, cattle, and liquor.[23] The clash of two societies—one of roaming gangs of seemingly irredeemable white "ruffians," "Idlers," and "Vagabonds," who were often joined by runaway slaves and free mulattos; the other an aspiring class of white slave-owning planters—threatened to undermine the social order of a plantation society the landowners hoped to establish in the backcountry. In 1767, these tormented landowners submitted a "Remonstrance," a petition penned by the minister, Charles Woodmason, to the

assembly, listing complaints against thieves and bandits and insisting upon reforms, including greater representation in the assembly (only two of the forty-eight assemblymen came from the backcountry), easier means to get their produce to market, lower taxes, more accessible courts, and more jails, sheriffs, churches, and schools.[24] When the assembly failed to act on these demands, the planters—who perhaps borrowed the name "Regulator" from their neighbors to the north—took matters into their own hands. Reports of groups of men "Committing Riot and disturbances" up and down the country and burning "the Houses of some Persons who were Reputed to be Harbourers of Horse Thieves," along with "talk of Coming to Charleston," filtered back to the capital. The authorities learned that these Regulators drove from the colony not only suspected thieves, but also some innocent residents. Not only had the Regulators threatened to march on Charleston, but they also signed in 1768 a "Plan of Regulation," a pledge of mutual support justifying the beating and whipping into submission of recalcitrant "idlers" who refused to take up farming.[25] From the provincial government's perspective, the Regulators were vigilantes, provocateurs, and outlaws themselves. Quickly, the assembly acted, and Governor Charles Montagu signed into law a series of measures designed to keep the peace. Yet when the Regulators found that the assembly had authorized neither county nor circuit courts, they refused to recognize the authority of the court in Charleston. Moreover, like their brethren in North Carolina, they refused to pay their taxes. Tensions between the Regulators and the provincial government escalated, and the court in Charleston issued warrants for the arrest of two dozen Regulators. Only after Governor Montagu toured the backcountry in 1769 did the Regulators receive relief; the assembly agreed to increase backcountry representation, to establish churches and schools there, and to set up a circuit court. However, the assembly's distractions over Parliament caused it to delay implementing many of these reforms. Nevertheless, the Regulators in South Carolina, most of whom would identify as patriots during the Revolution, made clear to the lowland gentry and to the coastal elites that they shared with them the same ambitions, the same interests, the same ideals, and the same aspirations: namely the individual pursuit of liberty, wealth, and property; the need for law and order; and the necessity of popular sovereignty. These impulses would fuel the zeal for revolution across the colonies.[26]

Throughout the 1760s and early 1770s, colonists on both sides of the Royal Proclamation line, which George Washington called "a temporary expedient to quiet the Minds of the Indians," maintained a steady gaze on Indian land in the backcountry.[27] Like Washington, most British officials in the colonies and in England knew that the ink boundary line of 1763 could never contain the squatters, farmers, and speculators in search of fertile land, bountiful pasturage, and lush forests. Short of actually expelling those with existing claims to lands west of the line, Britain would ultimately have to adjust the boundary. To this end, Lord Hillsborough, the president of the Board of Trade and secretary of state for the colonies, ordered the two superintendents for Indian affairs—Sir William Johnson in the North and John Stuart in the South—to negotiate and fix a new boundary line to replace the one drawn in 1763.

To avoid a repeat of the Cherokee War, Cherokee headmen and Stuart and his delegates quickly negotiated a new boundary at the Treaty of Hard Labor (1768), which moved the demarcation westward to place most of current-day West Virginia and southwestern Pennsylvania east of the boundary. The agreement left the rest of the line intact. Speculators, including such leading figures as Washington, Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, and Patrick Henry, among others, were not pleased that much of their investments continued to lie on the west side of the line. Weeks later, with three thousand Indians present, Sir William Johnson and the Six Nations of the Iroquois negotiated a treaty at Fort Stanwix (present-day Rome, New York) that involved the legally dubious transfer of vast tracts of land in the Ohio Valley to the British. The line in New York moved only slightly to the west, thereby keeping Mohawk communities with whom Johnson was kin, thanks to his marriage to Molly Brant, east of the new "Line of Property." However, over the objections of the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos, the boundary line took a sharp jog to the west in Pennsylvania to follow the Ohio River down to the Tennessee River, thereby placing much of Kentucky with all of Pennsylvania and Virginia within Britain's domain. Thomas Gage, who had succeeded Amherst as commander in chief of the British army in North America, believed correctly that this new line would neither slake the thirst of speculators and settlers for backcountry land, nor ease Indian-colonist tensions, nor relieve Britain of the cost of backcountry peacekeeping. Quite the opposite: with France gone, little could impede white encroachment on Indian lands. Poor and middling farm families from southern New England pushed deeper into what would become Vermont. Tenant farmers from eastern New York and Pennsylvania plunged into the Mohawk and Susquehanna valleys respectively, where they paid little rent but improved the land for large landowners by building mills, schools, and churches, and by clearing forests for pasturage. Settlers from several other colonies and parts of Europe pressed into the backcountries of Georgia and Florida. Most aggressive of all were the settlers and speculators who pursued Ohio Valley lands. Continuous pressure on backcountry lands, coupled with the utter inability of Britain to contain that pressure, produced the worst of all possible results: alienation of both colonists and Indians, and an even more unstable backcountry.

A continuous pattern of bad policy-making helped fuel a sense of white entitlement to Indian lands. In 1772, Hillsborough and Gage, hoping to discourage further settlement and thus further expense, agreed that Fort Pitt, so long a flashpoint, should be razed and abandoned. The decision backfired irreparably. In the vacuum left by the British forces and their fort, an intercolonial squabble ensued over who held jurisdiction over the Monongahela Valley—Virginia or Pennsylvania. As Virginians and Pennsylvanians in the region faced off against each other, Shawnee warriors skirmished with Virginia hunters in Kentucky, the Shawnees' hunting grounds. Their clashes caught the attention of Virginian combatants at Pittsburgh, some of whom retaliated by killing several known, neighboring Shawnee and Delaware traders and their family members, including members of Logan's family. Although Logan tried to keep his raids surgically contained, rumors led local

whites to believe that the entire Monongahela Valley would soon be drenched in Logan's rage. In October 1774, the twenty-four-hundred-man militia force, led by Connolly and Dunmore, defeated the Shawnees. Both sides agreed to work out the terms of peace at a later date, but the start of the American Revolution in the spring of 1775 thwarted their intentions. Nevertheless, Virginia farmers claimed outright ownership to Shawnee country.[28]

An ongoing pattern of careless, impulsive policy-making helped fuel the independence movement. By 1776, British policy had destabilized the backcountry to such a degree that it had become even more ungovernable and more costly to maintain than it had been in 1763. The Quebec Act, following close upon the Coercive Acts of 1774, recognized the Ohio River as the official southern boundary of the province of Quebec. Land north of the Ohio River, to which many speculators believed they held legitimate deeds, now lay in Quebec. Americans grew increasingly frustrated with the British government, believing that Mother England was not interested in protecting their constitutional rights as British citizens. With the French no longer a counterbalance to westward-surging Anglo-American settlers, it was only a matter of time, many French and English officials believed, before the Americans seized the moment to rebel. Reflecting on the period 1763 to 1783, Henry Ellis, former governor of Georgia, contended that "the dispossession of the French from Canada . . . necessarily tended to promote and accelerate" the independence movement in the colonies. Moreover, an expanding, unwieldy backcountry that the government was "unable to maintain, defend, and govern," accompanied by an ever-increasing national debt, made "the final independence of those colonies," Ellis seemed to suggest, almost a fait accompli.[29] For most land-seeking Americans, unencumbered access to land lay at the core of their principle of freedom. For them, the Privy Council's insistence that it approve all land deeds represented a violation of one of the colonists' natural rights: the pursuit of property. In order to realize their natural rights of life, liberty, and property, and to ensure the principles of independence, freedom, and self-sufficiency, American colonists realized that they would have to nullify such impediments as the Quebec Act and the Privy Council's strict land-deed law. The means for doing this was through the revolutionary rejection of British rule, a process that, in the backcountry, at least, had long been under way by 1776.

Notes

1. Devereaux Smith to Dr. William Smith, June 10, 1774, Pittsburgh, as cited in Jack M. Sosin, ed., *The Opening of the West* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 11–14; G[eorge]. R[ogers]. Clark to Samuel Brown, June 17, 1798, James Alton James, ed., *George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771–1781*, Virginia Series, 2 vols., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library vol. 8, 19 (Springfield, IL: Illinois State Historical Library, 1912, 1926) III: 3–9; Governor Earl of Dumore to Earl of Dartmouth (No. 23), December 24, 1774, *Documents of the American Revolution, 1770–1783* (Colonial Office Series), 21 vols., ed. E. K. Davies (Shannon and Dublin: Irish University Press, 1972–1981), 8: 258; Patrick Griffin, *American*

Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 110; David L. Preston, *The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667–1783* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 241, 263.

2. William Preston, circular letter, July 20, 1774, as cited in Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 34; Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673–1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 194; Sosin, *Opening of the West*, 22.

3. Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 193–194; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 362–364; Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 159–160.

4. Maj.-General Frederick Haldimand to Earl of Dartmouth, November 3, 1773, New York, *Documents of the American Revolution, 1770–1783,* 6:237–238. For the campaign as epilogue see White, *Middle Ground*, 355–365.

5. Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch, "Property," *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 620; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 194. For the campaign as prologue see Holton, *Forced Founders*, 33–38; for the campaign as both prologue and epilogue see Hinderaker and Mancall, *Edge of Empire*, 160; and Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 186, 194–195, 201.

6. For white anti-Indian attitudes see Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700–1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Preston, *Texture of Contact*; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*. For white class or status tensions see Marjoleine Kars, *Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Michael Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early Frontier* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993); Alan Taylor, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760–1820* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Marvin L. Michael Kay, "The North Carolina Regulation, 1766–1776: A Class Conflict," in *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism*, ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), 71–123; Rachel N. Klein, "Ordering the Backcountry: The South Carolina Regulation," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., vol. 38, no. 4 (October 1981): 661–680; Richard Maxwell Brown, *The South Carolina Regulators* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963).

7. George Quimby, *Indian Culture and European Trade Goods: Archaeology of the Historic Period in the Western Great Lakes* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), as cited in Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 69.

8. Cadwallader Colden, "The State of the Lands in the Province of New York, in 1732," in *Documentary History of the State of New York*, 4 vols., ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Co., Printers, 1849–1851), 1:384; Preston, *Texture of Contact*, 75.

9. Preston, *Texture of Contact*, 64; William Hart, "Black 'Go-Betweens' and the Mutability of 'Race,' Status, and Identity on New York's Pre-Revolutionary Frontier," in

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10. Preston, *Texture of Contact*, 116–146; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 110, 130–132.

11. Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws*, 33–34, 43, 96–111, 86.

12. Charles Woodmason, *The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution*, ed. Richard J. Hooker (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), 6–8.

13. J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer* (London, 1782; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957), 50, 42.

14. Ibid., 48, 42, 34.

15. Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Vintage, 2001), 457–468.

16. Calloway, *Scratch of a Pen*, 69 (esp. chap. 3).

17. Ibid., 76–79; Hinderaker and Mancall, *Edge of Empire*, 134–136; Merritt, *Crossroads*, 285–290.

18. Paul B. Moyer, *Wild Yankees: The Struggle for Independence along Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Frontier* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 25–31; Merritt, *Crossroads*, 288, 204.

19. Kay, "North Carolina Regulation," 73–77; Hooker, *Carolina Backcountry*, 165–189; Klein, "Ordering the Backcountry," 661–680.

20. Kay, "North Carolina Regulation," 76–77, 91–98; Kars, *Breaking Loose*, 113, 174–175.

21. Kars, *Breaking Loose*, 172–175; Kay, "North Carolina Regulation," 97-100.

22. Kay, "North Carolina Regulation," 100–108.

23. Woodmason,"The Remonstrance," in *Carolina Backcountry*, 226–227; Klein, "Ordering the Backcountry," 676–677.

24. Woodmason, "The Remonstrance," in *Carolina Backcountry*, 213–246.

25. Klein, "Ordering the Backcountry," 678.

26. Hooker, *Carolina Backcountry*, 165–189; Hinderaker and Mancall, *Edge of Empire*, 137–138.

27. George Washington to William Crawford, September 17, 1767, *The Writings of George Washington, 1745–1799*, 39 vols., ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931–1944), 2: 469.

28. Hinderaker and Mancall, *Edge of Empire*, 157–160; Holton, *Forced Founders*, 33–38; White, *Middle Ground*, 355–365.

29. Calloway, *Scratch of a Pen*, 168.

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CHAPTER 3

THE POLITE AND THE PLEBEIAN

MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN

The summer before, Alexander Hamilton had been fearful for his life. By the spring of 1744, he no longer suffered from the "fevers and bloody spitting" that had afflicted him then. But he was far from well. His recovery, such as it was, had left him with "an incessant cough," and he knew as well as anyone what that meant.[1]

Hamilton was a doctor. He had recently completed his studies at the University of Edinburgh, the medical capital of the Western world. He had quit his native Scotland and crossed the Atlantic to join his brother in Maryland and to establish himself as a physician there. And then he had come down with that cough.

He did not need the scientific training he had acquired in Edinburgh to know that his prospect was not promising. He had what medical men of the eighteenth century called consumption—what we know as tuberculosis—and he could only resign himself to its ravages. There was nothing in the pharmacopoeia of the time that could "abate or diminish" its advance.[2]

But it was one thing to be unable to cure his consumption, another to aggravate it. Summer was the dangerous season in the Chesapeake. In July and August, Hamilton wrote, "every house was an infirmary." He knew that he needed to get as far as he could from the miasmas of Maryland. So he devoted his spring to planning a trip to the cooler climes of the North, to guard his health and to learn something of the new land to which he had removed.[3]

At the end of May, Hamilton and his slave Dromo set off from his home in Annapolis. Their journey kept them on the road for four months and carried them from Delaware to modern-day Maine. Their travels took them to eight very different colonies, each of which harbored a host of divergent parochial cultures formed by differing settlement patterns, economies, family systems, and religiosities.